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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
under section 4-213. Before completion of the process of posting, but
after some manifestation of a determination to pay an item, the payor
bank could become accountable for the value of a check to the payee if
section 4-303(1)(d) were applied as the court in Schultz briefly suggested.
Such a result could not be reconciled with the provisions of section
4-213. Thatsection expressly and unequivocally provides that a payor
shall be accountable upon final payment. Subparagraph (1)(c) states that
completion of the process of posting shall constitute final payment. The
preamble to section 4-109 defines "process of posting" as the procedure
in determining to pay an item and recording the payment.
The Schultz decision represents a significant judicial step in the clarifi-
cation of the concept of final payment under the Uniform Commercial
Code. The holding renders meaning to all of the provisions relating to
final payment, and substantially advances the intent and policies underly-
ing Article 4 of the Code. However, the court's cursory reference to the
applicability of section 4-303(1)(d) in a suit by a payee or holder against
a payor indicates that ambiguities persist. It has been suggested that sec-
tions 4-303(1)(d) and 4-213(1)(c) were intended to apply to the same fac-
tual situations. 49 In fact, because of the differences in their 'triggering'
provisions, such application could render conflicting results. Until legis-
lative resolution of the inconsistencies, it would appear wise to continue
to decide payee-payor suits under the provisions of section 4-213(1)(c)
which expressly govern accountability.
GEORGE E. MURRAY III
CRIMINAL LAW-SELF DEFENSE
AND THE RIGHT TO RESIST
AN UNLAWFUL ARREST
State v. Nunes 1
Thomas Nunes provoked a fight with the night manager of a grocery
store. When three police officers arrived and attempted to arrest Nunes,
he began to "flail wildly" at them. Nunes continued his resistance even
after being struck on the head with a night stick, handcuffed, and placed
in the police car. He finally was subdued when sprayed with mace.
Nunes was charged with striking a police officer engaged in the perfor-
49. See authorities cited notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text supra. The
contrary view is set out in notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
1. 546 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
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mance of his duties.2 He admitted striking the first blow in the alterca-
tion with the night manager but asserted that he did not intentionally
strike or swing at any police officer; -his purpose in grappling with the
officers was to protect himself from harm.3 The trial court refused to
instruct the jury on Nunes' theory of self defense, relying on the basis of
State v. Briggs-4 which denied the right to resist arrest even under a sta-
tute later found to be unconstitutional. Nunes was convicted of striking a
police officer.
On appeal Nunes contended that the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct on self defense. He argued that State v. Briggs concerned resist-
ing arrest and not self defense, and that therefore the trial court's re-
liance on that case in denying the proferred instruction on self defense
was misplaced. The Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the conviction. The court found that Nunes was not enti-
tled to a self defense instruction because there was no substantial evi-
dence that excessive force was employed by the police officers when the
use of such force was not provoked by the arrestee. 5 Hence, the prof-
fered instruction was not required by the evidence.
Although the court affirmed the conviction, it agreed with the
defendant that the trial court had "confounded two disparate issues-
self defense and resistance to arrest."'6  In considering the question
whether there still exists in Missouri the right to defend against the use
of excessive force by an arresting officer, the court of appeals differen-
tiated the two defenses. The right to defend oneself and the right to
resist an unlawful arrest are separate defenses designed to serve differ-
ent functions. Self defense permits the arrestee reasonable resistance to
excessive force by the arresting officer in order to protect the arrestee's
life and limb. The right to resist an unlawful arrest permits reasonable
physical resistance to an officer making an unlawful arrest in order to
preserve the arrestee's liberty. The right to resist an unlawful arrest
2. Section 557.215, RSMo 1969, provides: "Any person who shall willfully
strike.., any police officer.., while such officer is actively engaged in the per-
formance of duties imposed on him by law... is guilty of a crime ...."
3. 546 S.W.2d at 761.
4. 435 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1968).
5. 546 S.W.2d at 764. Accord, State v. Spencer, 307 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. 1957);
State v. Ford, 344 Mo. 1219, 130 S.W.2d 635 (1939); State v. Milentz, 521
S.W.2d I (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975). For cases holding that any evidence, even
from the defendant alone, is sufficient to instruct on self defense, see State v.
White, 274 S.W. 17 (Mo. 1925); State v. Arnett, 228 Mo. 253, 167 S.W. 526
(1914); State v. Bidstrup, 237 Mo. 273, 140 S.W. 904 (1911); State v. Garrett,
170 Mo. 395, 70 S.W. 686 (1902); State v. Fredericks, 136 Mo. 51, 37 S.W. 832
(1896); State v. Alley, 68 Mo. 124 (1878); State v. Robinson, 182 S.W. 113 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1916); Brubaker v. Bidstrup, 163 Mo. App. 646, 147 S.W. 541 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1912).
6. 546 S.W.2d at 762.
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could be invoked even though the arresting officer does not use exces-
sive force, 7 but the use of unreasonable and unnecessary force by the
arresting officer does not make the arrest itself unlawful and thereby
create the right to resist an unlawful arrest. The arrestee Can only resist
the excessive force in an otherwise lawful arrest under the right of self
defense.
The rules of self defense in the context of an arrest are analogous to
the rules of self defense generally. An arresting officer may use such
force as is reasonably necessary to make the arrest. Unnecessary force
used by the officer may be resisted by the arrestee in the same manner
that a private individual attacked by another may defend himself if he
has reason to believe that he is in danger of receiving great bodily
harm.8 However, an arrestee being arrested lawfully who provokes the
use of force against him by openly defying the arresting officer may not
excuse his resistance with a claim of self defense.9 This rule parallels
that applying to private individuals. The aggressor who creates a situa-
tion frought with peril in which he injures or kills his assailant cannot
invoke the right of self defense.
The law requires an officer making an arrest to be the aggressor. He
must press forward to overcome all resistance to bring the arrestee
under physical restraint. This demonstrates that an arrestee must submit
to the amount of force reasonably necessary to make the arrest provided
that the arrest itself is lawful. In this respect, the arrestee's right to self
defense differs from the law of self defense generally; under the latter,
one need not submit to any aggression. This rule is only applicable if the
arrestee knows that he is being arrested by a police officer. If he does
not know, or have reason to know, the right of self defense should exist
as with other private individuals.' 0
The common law rule that an official in excess of his authority could
be resisted by physical force was recognized in England by 1710.11 The
reason for the rule was that an unlawful arrest was so provocative that it
7. Comment, Criminal Law-Arrest- The Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest, 7 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 119, 120 (1967).
8. 546 S.W.2d at 763.
9. 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 216 (1957).
10. State v. Ford, 344 Mo. 1219, 130 S.W.2d 635 (1939). The arresting of-
ficer must inform the arrestee under what authority he acts as required by§ 544.180, RSMo 1969. There is no requirement that an officer identify himself
and announce his mission. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Failure to
inform the arrestee under what authority the officer acts would not undermine
the legality of the arrest provided that the officer's authority is apparent and the
arrestee has a good idea for what he is being arrested. See Montgomery v.
United States, 403 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969);
State v. Brothers, 445 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1969).
11. The Queen v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710).
746 [Vol. 43
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would raise heat of passion in a reasonable man. 2 It would justify an
assault or reduce murder to manslaughter.13  However, the right was
not unqualified. If there was no provocation, there was no right to resist.
A mere technical defect causing the arrest to be unlawful was not suffi-
cient reason for resistance with physical force. 14 If some time had
passed since the arrest, resistance was unjustified as the provocation
would subside upon reflection.' 5 The rule which emerged allowed
reasonable resistance to a patently unlawful arrest 16 but not to an arrest
which was valid on its face. American courts adopted the English rule,
although there was a tendency to find any defect in the process as jus-
tifying resistance.' 7  On those occasions when American courts attemp-
ted to apply the "patently unlawful/valid on its face" distinction, the re-
sults were often inconsistent.18
Missouri courts have recognized the right to resist an unlawful ar-
rest.'9 The same tendency can be seen in Missouri as in other American
jurisdictions- to accord automatic recognition to the right to resist if the
arrest was unlawful. The provocative nature of the process usually was
not closely examined. A distinction was not generally drawn between an
12. Moreland, The Use of Force in Effecting or Resisting Arrest, 33 NEB. L. REV.
408, 423 (1954).
13. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128, 1129
(1969).
14. The Queen v. Davis, I Leigh 8 C.C.C. 64 (Carmarthen Assizes 1861); 1 J.
TURNER, RUSSELL ON CRIME, 508-611 (11th ed. 1958). Davis was charged with
the murder of a constable who was executing a warrant which contained some
technical defects. The court held that if the process was not facially defective and
was issued by a court or magistrate having jurisdiction in the case, the killing of a
minister of justice in the execution of the warrant would be murder although
there may have been error or irregularity in the proceeding previous to issuing
the process.
15. 1 J. TURNER, supra note 14, at 508. For an example of resistance some
time after the initial arrest, see State v. Ross, 492 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. 1973), where
the defendant, after the booking procedure was finished and while being trans-
ported to a cell, struck an officer with his fist.
16. Chevigny, supra note 13, at 1131. See Hopkin Huggett's Case, 84 Eng.
Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666) (impressment of a soldier); The Queen v. Tooley, 2 Ld.
Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710) (arrest on suspicion of being disor-
derly); The King v. Thompson, 168 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1825) (arrest for re-
fusal to finish work); The King v. Curvan, 168 Eng. Rep. 1213 (K.B. 1826) (ar-
rest on suspicion of making an insult). Chevigny notes that in all the above cases
there probably was no underlying offense upon which the arrest could be made.
Id.
17. Id..
18. See Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1146 (1966). The cases are not in harmony as to
when process is void on its face. An extreme case held that the defense of re-
sisting an unlawful arrest would be available when the arrest warrant did not
have a seal. State v. Weed, 21 N.H. 262 (1850).
19. See Kansas City v. Mathis, 409 S.W.2d 280 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966); City of
St. Louis v. Penrod, 332 S.W.2d 34 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
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arrest "valid on its face" and one "patently unlawful." However, even
though Missouri courts tended to recognize automatically the right to
resist an unlawful arrest, the defense has been most readily recognized
when the circumstances of the arrest were singularly provocative.20
The Nunes court interpreted State v. Briggs as changing the common
law rule in Missouri and abrogating the right to resist an unlawful ar-
rest.2 1 However, the decision in Briggs actually was consistant with prior
Missouri case law. The defendant in Briggs contended that his arrest was
unlawful since the ordinance he allegedly violated was unconstitutional.
The court did not consider the validity of the ordinance violated; 22 they
instead reasoned that to permit persons to resist arrest physically and
then to be excused if they successfully question the constitutionality or
validity of a statute or ordinance would "lead to chaos and would be
intolerable. ' 23  It must be noted that the circumstances of this arrest
were not provocative. In fact, the court specifically held that the arrest
was lawful; there was evidence 24 that the defendant committed a mis-
20. Chevigny, supra note 13, at 1143-49. Chevigny noted characteristics of
particularly provocative unlawful arrests: (1) face-to-face disputes arising out of a
"stop and frisk" or from orders to "keep moving"; (2) the absence of an offense
under which the arrestee could be charged; (3) knowledge by the arresting of-
ficer that the complaint is false; (4) the existence of personal animosity between
the arrestee and the arresting officer; and (5) an arrestee who has been re-
peatedly arrested. The last two categories often are present in an unlawful ar-
rest. E.g., Kansas City v. Mathis, 409 S.W.2d 280 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966). In
Mathis the defendant had been repeatedly arrested by the same officer on
charges of vagrancy and prostitution. The court found the arrest unlawful be-
cause there were no reasonable grounds to support it but did not comment on
the particularly provocative circumstances. The court stated that "[a]ny unlawful
interference with the fundamental right of personal liberty may be resisted. Ac-
cordingly, every person has a right to resist an unlawful arrest." Id. at 286.
In City of St. Louis v. Penrod, 332 S.W.2d 34 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960) the
defendant was arrested on suspicion of attempted child molestation. The arrest-
ing officer's reason for the arrest was that the defendant frequented public bath-
rooms and did not provide him requested identification. The defendant testified
to a previous confrontation with the arresting officer. The court found no
reasonable grounds to support the arrest. It did not comment on the provocative
circumstances but nonetheless found that the defendant "had the right to use
such force as was reasonably necessary to prevent" his unlawful arrest. Id. at 39.
21. 546 S.W.2d at 762. The court stated: "Briggs merely departs from the
common law rule which allows resistance to an unlawful arrest by the use of
reasonable force.... Briggs means that a citizen may not use force to resist any
arrest, lawful or unlawful .. "
22. 435 S.W.2d at 364-65.
23. Id. at 365.
24. The evidence showed that the owners of a local tavern summoned the
arresting officers after several fights had broken out in the bar. When the offi-
cers arrived the owner pointed at the defendant, whose clothes were mussed up
and disorderly, his eyes bloodshot, and his speech slurred. There was no evi-
dence of a prior police harassment or animosity toward the defendant, nor did it
appear that at the time of his arrest the defendant knew or was concerned with
whether he had been arrested unlawfully or under a valid ordinance.
[Vol. 43
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deameanor in the officer's presence.25 Under Missouri case law prior to
Briggs the right to resist would not arise under these circumstances.
The present status of Missouri law as to whether there still is a right to
resist an unlawful arrest is in conflict. Until the Nunes decision, the cases
clearly and repeatedly recognized the right to resist an unlawful ar-
rest.16 State v. Briggs is consistent with prior case law. The Nunes deci-
sion is authority for the proposition that the common law defense is no
longer recognized in Missouri. However, the language in Nunes con-
cerning the abrogation of the right to resist is dictum.2 7 Moreover, in at
least four cases Missouri courts have declined to adopt the Nunes court's
interpretation of State v. Briggs as abrogating the defense.2 s
25. Section 80.410, RSMo 1969, provides that a town marshal shall have the
right to arrest without process for violation of a city ordinance committed in his
presence.
26. See cases cited note 19 supra.
27. Nunes was affirmed because the defendant failed to elicit evidence show-
ing a basis for an instruction on self defense. 546 S.W.2d at 764. The defendant
never alleged that he was resisting an unlawful arrest. In fact, among other
things, the defendant requested an instruction on resistance to process. Hence,
he was not contending that his arrest was unlawful but rather that he had re-
sisted a lawful arrest.
State v. Rodriguez, 484 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1972), further confuses the case law
as to the right to resist. While being arrested, the defendant struck one of the
arresting officers. He was prosecuted and convicted for striking a police officer
in the performance of his duties in violation of § 557.215, RSMo 1969. The
defendant asked for an instruction that would require a finding that the arrest-
ing officer had reasonable cause to make the arrest in order to be "in the per-
formance of his duties." The court stated that it was not necessary to make such
a finding to decide that the officer was engaged in the performance of his
duties. This indicates that even if an officer is making an unlawful arrest, he can
still be in the performance of his duties. This effectively negated the defendant's
right to resist an unlawful arrest. However, the defendant in Rodriguez did not
specifically raise the defense. The same question was raised in State v. Bradley,
515 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974), and the court, citing Rodriguez, came
to the same conclusion. Cf District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1972)
(District of Columbia Circuit held that a police officer making an unlawful arrest
was acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes. Carter v. Carlson, 447
F.2d 358 (1971). On appeal, the Supreme Court did not reach this question
because it held that the District of Columbia was not a state or territory within
the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1973)).
28. Other Missouri courts have not interpreted Briggs as abrogating the
common law rule. The Missouri Supreme Court has had two opportunities to do
so. In State v. Bennett, 468 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1971), the defendant was arrested
for disorderly and insulting conduct. In State v. Brothers, 445 S.W.2d 308 (Mo.
1969), a case factually analogous to Briggs, the defendant was arrested for fight-
ing in public and disturbing the peace. Both defendants contended that their
arrests were unlawful because no misdemeanor had been committed in the offic-
ers' presence. If the common law rule had been changed by Briggs, the question
of the lawfulness of the arrests would have been irrelevant. Nonetheless, the
court considered the defendants' contentions but found both arrests lawful and
affirmed. Briggs was not cited in Bennett nor was it cited in a footnote to Brothers
7491978] RECENT CASES
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Even though present case law is conflicting as to the existence in Mis-
souri of a right to resist an unlawful arrest, the statute is now clear. In
its last legislative session, the General Assembly adopted section 575.150
of the new Criminal Code, which makes it a crime to resist or interfere
with an arrest if the arrestee knows that a law enforcement officer is
making the arrest. The common law defense of resisting an unlawful
arrest is specifically eliminated.2 9 The right of self defense against the
unreasonable and excessive force by an arresting officer was not affected
by the statute. This provision is not effective until January 1, 1979, so
until that time, Missouri case law will determine the rights of an arrestee
subject to an unlawful arrest. The new statutory provisions align Mis-
souri with the increasing number of states that have abrogated the right
to resist an unlawful arrest.30 The rule in these jurisdictions is that
where the court stated that "the theory of a right to resist physically an illegal
arrest is waning, and has been severely criticized and rejected by persuasive au-
thorities." 445 S.W.2d at 310 n.1. In State v. Bradley, 515 S.W.2d 826 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1974), the defendant contended that because his arrest was without
a warrant he had a right to resist the allegedly unlawful arrest. The Kansas City
District of the Missouri Court of Appeals closely examined the legality of the
arrest and found competent evidence to support it. If Briggs had abrogated the
defense of resisting an unlawful arrest, the lawfulness of the arrest in Bradley
would have been irrelevant. In City of St. Louis v. Treece, 502 S.W.2d 432 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1973), the defendant went to the aid of his wife and son who
were allegedly being unlawfully arrested. The court held that there was no right
to resist an illegal arrest by a third person on another person's behalf. The court
relied on United States v. Vigil, 431 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 918 (1971). On the basis of Briggs, which the court did not cite, Treece
should have been an a fortiori case. If the arrestee has no right to resist an
unlawful arrest, a third person should not have such a right that he can exercise
in favor of another. It is thus evident that Missouri courts have not treated Briggs
as changing the common law rule. Briggs is actually consistent with the English
approach in that it held there to be no right to resist when the circumstances of
arrest were not provocative.
29. Section 575.150, RSMo (effective January 21, 1979) provides:
1. A person commits the crime of resisting or interfering with arrest
if, knowing that a law enforcement officer is making an arrest, for
the purpose of preventing the officer from effecting the arrest, he:
(1) resists the arrest of himself by using or threatening the use of
violence or physical force or by fleeing from the officer; or,
(2) interferes with the arrest of another person by using or
threatening the use of violence, physical force or physical interfer-
ence....
(3) It is no defense ... that the law enforcement officer was act-
ing unlawfully in making the arrest. However, nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to bar civil suits for unlawful arrest.
30. Before 1977, forty-two states recognized the right to resist an unlawful
arrest. Four states have changed the common law rule by statute. See R.I. GEN.
LAws § 12-7-10 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594:5 (1955); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 1905 (1953); CAL. PENAL CODE § 835(a) (West 1965). Four states have
changed the common law rule by judicial decision. See Miller v. State, 462 P.2d
750 [Vol. 43
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when a person knows he is being arrested by an officer of the law, he
cannot physically resist unless it is necessary to protect his physical well-
being. 1
The reasons for recommending the abandonment of the common law
rule are grounded on the assumption that such a change will lead an
arrestee to "challenge the validity of arrest[s] in courts rather than on
the streets." 32 From an historical perspective, it is argued that the un-
availability of bail often led to lengthy pre-trial detainment in over-
crowded, disease-riddened jails, and that an arrestee had good reason to
resist an unlawful arrest. At present, because of better jail conditions,
improved police methods, prompt arraignment, the setting of bail, 33
administrative remedies, and injunction and civil damages, it simply is
not practical to resist physically an unlawful deprivation of one's lib-
erty. 34 Further, the defense of resisting an unlawful arrest cannot ac-
complish its purpose of preventing the arrest because the defense is only
raised in a criminal trial, after the arrest has taken place. 35  Another
421 (Alaska 1969); People v. Carrol, 133 Ill. App. 2d 78, 272 N.E.2d 822 (1971);
State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1965).
31. See Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 1071, 1087 (1972). The statutes abrogating the
common law right to resist an unlawful arrest have been upheld as constitutional
in the face of a challenge that the right to resist an unlawful arrest has a con-
stitutional basis. See Note, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HARv. L. REV. 626
(1970). Chevigny, supra note 13, at 1138-39, argues that reasonable resistance to
an unlawful arrest should be legitimated in order to protect first amendment
freedoms. Otherwise, it might be easy to curb the exercise of free speech in the
form of protest demonstrations by alleging that demonstrators are resisting ar-
rest. Chevigny also argues that due process protects against punishment for vio-
lating an arbitrary police order which is very similar to an arrest. See Shuttles-
worth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) (reversed conviction for
obstructing the sidewalk by refusing to move when so ordered). Chevigny also
finds constitutional dimensions to the right to resist in Wainwright v. City of
New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam). A Tulane law student was
charged with resisting arrest and breach of the peace. The student claimed that
the charges resulted from an unlawful arrest. Although the Supreme Court dis-
missed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, Chief Justice Warren "in-
timated that the right to resist an unlawful 'seizure of the person' may be basic to
the fourth amendment." Id. at 608 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Chevigny, supra
note 13, at 1129. But see Note, supra, at 638 (suggestion that the cases relied on
by Chevigny for support of a constitutional right to resist "offer little support for
even so modest an assertion").
32. Note, supra note 31, at 637.
33. Comment, supra note 7, at 121-22.
34. Chevigny, supra note 13, at 1134-35.
35. Id. at 1137. Chevigny notes that "the existence of other rights does not
depend upon whether it is prudent for the individual to assert them."
A frequently asserted reason for recommending the abandonment of the rule
has been that it is primarily the guilty who resist an unlawful arrest. See Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 124. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315(1942) asserts that only "guntoting hoodlums and gangsters" will use the right to
resist arrest. This assertion is not supported by the Missouri cases. E.g., Kansas
8
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reason for abrogating the common law defense is that in the context of
an arrest two legally sanctioned uses of force conflict. 36  An arrestee
who has a good faith belief that he is being unlawfully arrested may
resist. At the same time, the law requires an officer who is making an
arrest to be the aggressor. He must press forward to overcome all resis-
tance to bring the arrestee under physical restraint.37 If the defense is
recognized, both parties may be authorized to use sufficient force to
overcome the other. An escalation of the clash would be likely, with po-
tentially dangerous consequences for the arrestee, the officer, and by-
standers.38
The root of this conflict originates in two subjective determinations of
the lawfulness of the arrest-that by the arrestee and that by the ar-
resting officer. An innocent man may be lawfully arrested provided
there is reasonable cause supporting the arrest; a guilty man may be
unlawfully arrested. However, the reasonable grounds supporting the
arrest are very likely known only to the arresting officer, and in many
situations the arrestee has no sure method of determining the legality of
his arrest.39
All of these reasons assume that changing the legal rule will cause
arrestees to reflect on the consequences of resisting arrest and choose
the more practical alternative of litigation of the issue of lawfullness.4 °
However, the decision to resist is not deliberate or reflective. The con-
sequences, if foreseen at all, are considered only momentarily and then
in the heat of passion. 41 Changing the defense is unlikely to deter
physical violence between the police and arrestees. The question is not
whether the arrestee can be certain that he is being arrested unlawfully;
usually, he cannot. Nonetheless, if unlawfully arrested, one should not
be punished for resisting the arrest if sufficiently provoked.4 2
The statutes eliminating the defense of resisting an unlawful arrest, as
well as case law to the same affect, have ignored the reason for existence
of the defense -provocation. Similarly, the American rule governing
application of the defense, still observed in a mjority of states, operates
automatically if the arrest is unlawful, and thereby ignores the provoca-
tive circumstances of the arrest as much as recent statutes which flatly
prohibit the defense. Hence, in some American jurisdictions, application
of the rule would work automatically in favor of one who is not actually
City v. Mathis, 409 S.W.2d 280 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966) (defendant arrested for
prostitution and vagrancy); City of St. Louis v. Penrod, 332 S.W.2d 34 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1960) (defendant arrested on suspicion of child molestation).
36. Comment, supra note 7, at 125.
37. See State v. Ford, 344 Mo. 1219, 130 S.W.2d 635 (1939).
38. Comment, supra note 7, at 125.
39. Id. at 124-25.
40. Note, supra note 31, at 637.
41. Id.
42. Chevigny, supra note 13, at 1139.
752 [Vol. 43
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incensed by the illegality of the arrest. If the arrest is illegal because of
some technical defect unknown to the arrestee, he should not be allowed
to use this fortuity to vent possibly pre-existing malice. 43
Among the English, the American, and the Nunes/statutory approaches
to resisting arrest, the English common law rule is preferable. However,
although the distinction between a patently unlawful arrest and an arrest
valid on its face can be useful as a guide to determining provocation, it
should not be controlling. It is urged that the rule of reasonable provo-
cation should be applied to determine whether the defense of resistance
to unlawful arrest is available. If the arrest was unlawful, if a reasonable
man would have been provoked to resistance by its unlawfulness, and if
the defendant was, in fact, so provoked, he should be able to raise the
defense. The practical effect of such a rule as contrasted with the
Nunes/statutory approach can be illustrated by examining the facts of
Kansas City v. Mathis.4 4 In that case the defendant was arrested because
she had "a reputation of being a prostitute."45 The arresting officer
was well known to the defendant; he had arrested her for prostitution
on several previous occasions. At the time of her arrest, the defendant
was working as a waitress in a hotel. When she saw the arresting officer,
she ran outside and shortly thereafter was apprehended. At that time
she began to struggle and attempted to get away from the arresting of-
ficer. She was eventually tried and convicted in municipal court for
obstructing and resisting an officer. 46 The arrest was clearly unlawful
and the court of appeals so held.4 7 Under a rule of reasonable provo-
cation, if it would be reasonable for a person to be provoked to resis-
tance when arrested for prostitution while lawfully employed as a wait-
ress, and if this person was, in fact, so provoked, the defense would be
available. Under the Nunes/statutory approach, the defense of resisting
arrest would not be available under these circumstances. The arresting
43. It has been suggested that there are two different social policies under-
lying the right to resist an unlawful arrest. One is based on protecting the liberty
of the individual citizen against unlawful enforcement of the law. See People v.
Scalisi, 324 Ill. 131, 154 N.E. 715 (1926). The other underlying policy is based
upon the doctrine of provocation. See State v. Burnett, 354 Mo. 45, 188 S.W.2d
51 (1945) (murder of town marshal making an illegal arrest reduced to man-
slaughter). Jurisdictions which ground the right to resist upon protecting the
liberty of the individual citizen are more likely to reduce murder to manslaugh-
ter automatically without examining the existence vel non of provocative cir-
cumstances. In Moreland, The Use of Force in Effecting or Resisting Arrest, 33 NEB.
L. REv. 408 (1954), the author concludes that the preferable and majority rule is
that murder, when committed resisting an unlawful arrest, is not automatically
reduced to manslaughter unless the defendant was subjectively filled with the
heat of passion.
44. 409 S.W.2d 280 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
45. Id. at 285.
46. Id. at 282.
47. Id. at 287.
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